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Abstract 
 
This study aims to investigate whether the rental regulation in Gothenburg fulfill its purpose, 
by comparing difference in terms of rent levels for three different types of contract.  
The first one is owner occupied cooperative apartment that require a membership in the 
cooperative. An owner occupied cooperative apartment can be sold at the housing market and 
the owner buys a share of the cooperative, and the right to use the apartment. The second 
contract type is rental apartment, which is a regulated market. The third is secondary rental 
apartment contracts which is regulated but also exists on the black market.  
The results from this study shows a significant difference in monthly cost for apartments 
depending on area and contract type in Gothenburg. The results indicate that the rent for 
apartments on the primary market is significantly lower than the other contracts, indicating 
that the regulated primary rent is below the equilibrium rent. This cause problem in form of a 
growing black market, discrimination and a trend to convert rental apartments into owner 
occupied cooperative apartments.   
 
 
 
Keywords: Contract type, rental apartments, Gothenburg, regulated market, owner occupied 
cooperative apartments  
 
  
 
 
Definitions 
 
Owner occupied cooperative apartment Apartments sold at a free market where 
the buyer owns a share of the 
cooperative and the right to use the 
apartment 
(Primary) Rental apartment Apartments for rent on a regulated 
market 
Secondary rentalapartment Exist legally and regulated for all 
markets but also on the black market
   
Owner occupied apartment A form of housing since 2009. Same 
rules as for other real estate 
  
Cooperative rental apartment A mix between owner occupied 
cooperative apartment and rental 
apartment  
 
Locally negotiated rents  Negotiated rents on the regulated rental 
apartment market (2.4.1) 
  
Temporary fixed rents  Negotiated rents for newly built rental 
apartments. Allowed to be fixed for 
fifteen years (2.4.3) 
 
 
Quality rents  Rents determined based on quality and 
user value on the rental market (2.4.2) 
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1. Introduction 
 
This chapter describes the background to the housing market today for rental apartments and 
cooperative apartments. It continues with a problem discussion that leads to the research 
question that this study aims to answer, and also to its purpose.  
 
1.1 Background to the apartment market 
The market for tenancies affects a great deal of people and is a regulated market in Sweden. 
One of the reasons is that some security of tenure is needed. A third of the population in 
Sweden live in rental apartments and it is difficult to compare Sweden with other countries 
since the way rents are regulated are unique and complex. Sweden also has regional 
differences since the negotiations have different outcomes between the different regions 
(Boverket, 2014). 
 
The rental apartment market is different from other markets in many different ways. There are 
numerous preferences and people tend to not only choose depending on their income. Public 
transportation, region and an investment perspectives are some of the factors that affect 
tenants' choices (Boverket, 2014). 
 
There are four forms of tenure in Sweden; owner occupied cooperative apartment, rental 
apartment, owner occupied apartment and cooperative rental apartment. The owner occupied 
cooperative apartment requires a membership in a cooperative. An owner occupied 
cooperative apartment can be sold at the housing market and the owner buys a share of the 
cooperative, and the right to use the apartment.  
The rental apartments are typically rented from landlords. It is also possible to rent someone’s 
private apartment but that does not give the same security of tenure (Boverket.se, 2014).  
 
The most common types of apartments in Sweden are rental apartments and owner occupied 
cooperative apartment. The owner occupied cooperative apartment can be traded on an 
unregulated market while the market for rental apartments are regulated. Rents for the rental 
apartments can be determined by locally negotiated rents, temporary fixed rents and quality 
rents or by the landlord alone (Boverket, 2014). 
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1.2 Problem discussion 
All kinds of regulations have affected the society and regulations are considered necessary 
since the housing market affects many people. Criticism has been addressed towards the 
Swedish rent setting model by IMF, OECD and the European Commission (Boverket, 2014).  
 
Today, compared to the 90s, there are around 100 000 fewer rental units. A great part of the 
decrease can be explained by the conversion to owner occupied cooperative apartment, 
mainly in Stockholm (Boverket, 2014). If the rental market was unregulated the number of 
conversions might get affected, and also the supply for rental apartments. 
 
Many factors affect the rental market, and some of them are; tax rules, willingness to pay by 
tenants, competitiveness on the market and the cost for building and land (Boverket, 2014). 
Many things also affect the owner occupied cooperative apartment market and the housing 
shortage might affect the prices on owner occupied cooperative apartment.  
 
The share of the apartments that are owner occupied cooperative apartments has increased 
(Boverket, 2014) and the prices have risen 11.5 percent the last 12 months (Valueguard, 
2016). The population in Gothenburg had increased by 55 000 people the last ten years 
according to the Swedish Union of Tenants. Since the amount of built rental apartments has 
not been sufficient, it has resulted in long queues, unsafe secondary market, black trade with 
contracts and high prices on owner occupied cooperative apartments (Hyresgästföreningena). 
It is therefore interesting to examine how the markets for apartments affect each other.  
1.3 Purpose 
This study aims to answer how the regulation affect the market on apartments in Gothenburg. 
Does the regulation fulfill its purpose or does it cause side effects on the market. 
 
1.4 Research question 
Does the regulation on the primary rental market fulfill its purpose and how does the 
regulation affect the apartment market in Gothenburg?   
 
 
  
3 
 
2. Theory 
 
To be able to answer the research question of this paper the relevant theories are presented in 
this chapter.  
 
2.1 Rational Consumer Choice  
Rational consumers who actively weigh benefits and preferences to each other are assumed. If 
the sacrifice of a resource, input or change is greater than the benefit the consumer receives, 
the consumer abstains. The consumer is assumed to distinguish costs and revenues, and then 
to choose the alternative that receives the maximum benefit (Eklund, 2013, s 31-33). The 
consumer is assumed to have an income that is given to face fixed prices. Income and prices 
together form the consumer's budget constraint. In this model we assume the consumer’s 
preferences to be given and designed in the best way to satisfy the consumer. To solve the 
consumer budgeting problem, we need a preference ordering, where the consumer takes into 
account all possible bundles of goods and rank them by preference (Frank & Cartwright 2013, 
s 79). This model assumes perfect information and that the consumer has a good knowledge 
available options (Eklund, 2013, s 31-33). 
2.2 The  market theory for apartments  
In a free market the demand for apartments is due to which purchasing power the consumers 
have, what their preferences are and what options there are on the market. The supply side is 
determined by how many homes there are on the market at a particular time (Eklund 2013, 
42-45). The supply side of the housing differs from classical markets because the supply in 
the short time period is likely to be limited. The supply side of the housing market in the short 
run is inelastic and is illustrated in the graph below as a steep horizontal line. This is believed 
to be because the building of apartments is a time consuming process, which limit the supply 
in the short term. Although in the long term, the supply-side will be price elastic and equal a 
classic market. The classic market theory model does not describe reality completely, but 
manages to easily depict important aspects of reality (Eklund 2013, 42-49). 
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Figure 1Supply and demand for apartment markets, short term (Eklund, 2013) 
Equilibrium is reached when supply is equal to demand. At this point, the marginal benefit 
equals the marginal sacrifice and the return equals the marginal costs (Eklund, 2013, s. 47-49) 
The market for owner occupied cooperative apartments as well as the secondary market is 
assumed to be free markets. Demand and supply and will always seek equilibrium. Increasing 
demand for apartments will shift the demand curve in the model to the right, which 
contributes to the equilibrium price rises. In this specific situation we assume the increased 
demand is due to an increased number of consumers and not due to increased revenues. 
 
2.3 Regulated Rental market 
This market differs from the housing market in the way that the market is regulated. In other 
words, the rent charged for an apartment of a certain standard is limited. The market is 
regulated by political intervention to avoid the equilibrium price be too high. The supply 
curve will have a steep slope, as in the market of owner occupied cooperative apartment. In a 
free market the equilibrium price will be at the point, where the demand curve intersects the 
supply curve. But due to political interventions the rent will be set at a fixed level, this level is 
below the equilibrium price. This means that demand will increase, as more people are willing 
to pay the required price. The regulated rent also means that it will be unprofitable for some 
landlords to maintain rental units, which means that the supply of rental housing will fall. This 
leads to excess demand, the supply is not enough to satisfy the demand and we will see a 
shortage of apartments. The idea is to ensure that everyone can afford somewhere to live. 
However, the regulation may cause fewer apartments offered, increased prices, high 
administrative costs and a growing black market (Eklund 2013, 47-49).  
5 
 
 
 
Figure 2Regulatedrental market(Eklund, 2013) 
 
2.4 Determination of rent for rental apartments in Sweden 
The Swedish Union of Tenants has more than 500 000 households as members. Their mission 
is, among others, to negotiate rent, the terms and conditions, and support tenants 
(Hyresgästföreningen b). Swedish Property Federation has approximately 17 000 members 
owning 80 000 properties with 700 000 apartments. Most of the property owners that are 
members has rental apartments for residential purpose, facilities and industrial properties, the 
rest are cooperative apartments (Fastighetsägarna). 
 
2.4.1 Locally negotiated rents  
Locally negotiated rents should result in corresponding prices for similar apartments. The aim 
is to create conditions for a reasonable rental development with fair rents and security for the 
consumers. The purpose is to protect consumers from unreasonable high rents that would 
force tenants to move because one could not afford to pay the rent (Hyresgästföreningen, 
2013). However, one can now see that the locally negotiated rents has created a situation 
where the market is not in equilibrium and there is currently a housing shortage propagation. 
As the demand for rental apartments is greater than the supply, it creates demand surplus of 
rental properties, causing housing shortages and long waiting lists. A great demand surplus 
also means that there are consumers willing to pay higher prices for rental apartments than the 
regulation allows. This has in turn led to an extensive secondary and third market and a 
growing black market. Another consequence of rent control is that the number of rental units 
may decrease because in some cases it is unprofitable to hold rental apartments and thus 
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convert them into owner occupied cooperative apartment. Converting apartments to owner 
occupied cooperative apartment has become a trend (Axelsson C, 2005). 
 
2.4.2 Quality rents  
On the autumn 2007 all rental apartment properties was inspected with people from both of 
the negotiating sides. Locally negotiated rents allows the rent to be affected by what the 
tenants value based on fourteen different factors in four categories; Area, technical qualities 
of the property, service quality and relationship quality. Since some landlords works with 
developing quality and relationship. Some are more interested in the investments and the 
degree of how serious and ambitious they are differing. All of the negotiating parts agree that 
good quality should carry the right to charge higher rents. The parties do not agree about 
where the average rental level should lie or other rules for the market. But they now have the 
same information and idea about how the relationship between the rents should be. Statistics 
from The Rent Tribunal shows that the number of cases has decreased in Gothenburg, in 
opposite to before and other cities in Sweden. The benefit of quality rents to society is very 
large (Wennermark, 2008). Today the Swedish Union of Tenants still works with quality rents 
in the way described earlier. They have more material and the map with preferences has 
changed (Appendix 1). 
 
2.4.3 Temporary fixed rents  
The temporary fixed rents makes it possible to determine the rent for newly built rental 
apartments since 1 july 2006 according to 12 kap. 55 c § JB. The purpose is to stimulate the 
production of rental apartments by allowing a temporary higher rent. The agreement is valid 
for fifteen years, and after that the apartments are included in the locally negotiated rents 
(Boverket, 2014).  
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2.5 The situation today on the rental market 
The negotiating about the rent for 2016 started for private landlords at the autumn 2015. They 
did meet but were not able to agree. Swedish Property Federation did sent an application to 
The Rent Tribunal with the 43 000 affected apartments in Gothenburg. Swedish Property 
Federation claims that it is mostly about the rules and negative effects on the market and not 
about the rent levels itself (Fastighetsägarna, 2016). Erik Elmgren (2016, 15 january) at the 
Swedish Union of Tenants claims in his debate article that Swedish Property Federation 
acting irresponsible and odd (Elmgren, 2016, 15 january). 
 
2.5.1 Decrease in number of rental apartments  
The share of rental apartment of the total number of apartments has decreased between 1990 
and 2012. Apartments are built but the reason for the decrease is the increased number of 
owner occupied cooperative apartments (Boverket, 2014). In Gothenburg, close to half of the 
apartments are rented from public housing. If the operators impact with each other that might 
cause a price leadership and a less competitive market (Boverket, 2014). 
 
2.5.2 Housing shortage  
There are two perspectives when it comes to housing shortage; the market perspective and the 
political perspective. The market perspective defines housing shortage as a consequence of 
equilibrium above the actual rents. Increased demand partly leads to increased supply, 
because the supply is not completely price elastic. The political perspective focuses on the 
needs rather than the demand that represents the consumption norm. Besides the rent setting 
system and the fact that adjustment to demand takes time, poor competition and the planning 
process also affect the housing shortage (Boverket, 2014). 
 
2.5.3 Prices today  
The latest month the prices in Gothenburg for owner occupied cooperative apartments has 
increased by 1.1 percent and for the last year 11.5 percent (Valueguard, 2016). According to 
Swedish broker statistics the prices continues to rise and the latest month the supply for owner 
occupied cooperative apartment has decreased by 7 percent (Mäklarstatistik, 2016). 
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2.6 Effects of excess demand 
The impact of excess demand on a regulated market can be expected to have two possible 
outcomes in the market. Thies(2009) The first outcome Thies describe describe is that rent 
control can lead to undesirable effects in the form of an increased black market, 
discrimination and quality decrease in the apartment stock. In this situation consumers are 
willing to pay a higher price than what the market permits, means that the equilibrium price is 
above the regulated cap. This means that the regulation inhibit market from equilibrium. The 
market, which always seeks equilibrium, then will circumvent the problem by alternative 
mechanisms, like black trade, etc.(Thies, 2009). 
The second theory Thies describe is about what effects a regulated market can have on an 
unregulated market. In the article Thies investigate the market on regulated rental prices as 
well as free market rents for homogenous apartments, in geographic areas where there is full 
mobility between the sectors. Thies says that when demand exceeds supply in the regulated 
market, this will create spillover effects on the unregulated market (Thies, 2009). 
In equilibrium, the rent for the regulated market equals the rent for the unregulated market 
equilibrium and the equilibrium rent (Thies, 2009). 
 
 𝑅𝑐 = 𝑅𝑛 = 𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑢𝑚 
𝑅𝑐 = 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟  
𝑅𝑛 = 𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 
𝑅 = 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 
Thies (2009) claims that on a restricted market where the restricted price is below the 
equilibrium price, there will be a demand surplus in the regulated sector. This leads 
to  spillover effects on the unregulated sector, which makes R greater than the regulated rent 
and the unregulated rent is forced to increase.  
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Figure 3 Regulated market (Thies, 2009) 
Figure 4Unregulated market(Thies, 2009) 
The price of a homogenous product differs depending on whether the goods belong to the 
regulated or unregulated market. Hence, the price of a apartment on the regulated market will 
be lower than the price of an equivalent apartment on the unregulated market. For the market 
to accept this difference in price we have to add an additional cost to the regulated price, 
named as search costs. This means that consumers can access the goods in the regulated 
market at a lower price; however, they have to pay an additional search cost. The search cost 
can be defined as the amount of time the consumers spend on searching for an apartment, and 
the additional costs for choosing the black market (Thies, 2009). 
2.7  Black trade 
Black trade with attractive rental apartments tend to increase when the regulated price is 
below the equilibrium price. The National Board of Housing, Building and Planning 
(Boverket, 2014) estimated that the illegal trading with rental contracts in Stockholm alone 
amounted to 1.2 billion SEK each year, in a report conducted in 2006. It is difficult to 
estimate the propagation the black market, and there are often different opinions on the issue. 
In some places in Sweden there exists an extensive black market, suggesting that the current 
rent is below the equilibrium rent (Boverket, 2014). 
 
2.8 Efficiency Effects 
The Swedish rent setting system do not set a ceiling on rent levels, but in practice the 
regulation still makes the rent in the most attractive areas to set below the equilibrium price. A 
side effect of the system is that the supply of rental apartments tends to be below the social 
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optimum supply created at equilibrium rents. A further side effect is that consumers' 
willingness to pay when housing is allocated on the basis of other principles and lock-in effect 
reduces incentives to move. This means in practice that efficiency losses and welfare losses in 
the form of reduced consumer surplus arise. How big this welfare loss is being possible to 
estimate with recognized models in the context of national economic welfare theory. Previous 
studies have been done in the field and calculations have shown efficiency losses in annual 
billions SEK. The studies show that Stockholm and Gothenburg accounts for about 90 percent 
of the efficiency loss. When the actual rents are below the equilibrium rents it tend to keep 
potential tenants with higher willingness to pay out of the market. About 90 percent of the 
efficiency losses associated with rents are caused by how the stock is exploited (Boverket, 
2014).  
The rent setting system can also cause problems in a weak housing market, where the system 
support the rent to be maintained above the equilibrium level. Indicating that the system is 
characterized by rigidity and poor adaptation to supply and demand conditions in all markets. 
In other words, the rent setting system cause other negative socioeconomic effects in addition 
to the more well-known effects that arise in markets with excess demand. A study of how 
large efficiency losses of this type has never been made. Studies indicate that a rent pressure 
on the equilibrium price should be in the form of substitute competition from other forms of 
ownership (Boverket, 2014). 
 
2.9 Limitations 
The purpose of the paper is to examine whether the regulation fulfill its purpose, and if not 
how does the regulation affect the apartment market. The study is limited to investigating the 
market in Gothenburg. Due to time limitation the study do not take economic variables such 
as inflation, GDP, real wage growth to a greater extent into account. The study is assumed to 
provide a reliable indication of how the market looks even if these factors are not taken into 
account. 
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2.10 Hypothesis 
Thisstudy examineshow the rent regulation affects the apartment market in Gothenburg. 
Furthermore, the studyexamineswhetherthere is a statisticallysignificantdifference in 
pricebetween the contracts and if the area has an impact on the rent. Based on 
this,threehypothesis tests wasformulated : 
𝑯𝒚𝒑𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒔𝑨: 
𝐻0: 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑠  
𝐻1: 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑑𝑜 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑠  
 
 
𝑯𝒚𝒑𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒔𝑩: 
𝐻0: 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑  
𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
𝐻1: 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑  
𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
 
𝑯𝒚𝒑𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒔𝑪: 
𝐻0: 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑒𝑞𝑎𝑢𝑙 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒  
𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
𝐻1: 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑒𝑞𝑎𝑢𝑙 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 
 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
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3. Method 
 
This chapter starts with the  process of the literature review followed by how the data was 
collected. It continues with explaining how the data was processed.  
 
3.1 Process of literature review 
The literature should according to Bryman& Bell (2015) be examined critically and be related 
to the research question of interest in order to find relevant theoretical ideas (s. 14).Also, 
because it is important to know what is known in the area of interest since before (Bryman& 
Bell, 2015, s.100). The databases provided by Gothenburg University library and Google 
Scholar were used. Printed sources provided by the Economics library at Gothenburg 
university were also used.  
 
When searching for literature some suitable keywords need to be used (Bryman& Bell, 2015, 
s.116). The keywords that were used in different combinations to find relevant literature in 
this paper were: rental market, housing market, restricted, housing cooperatives, rental 
apartments, effect. Some of them were also translated into Swedish to be able to find more 
literature relating to the Swedish context.  
3.2 Data collection 
Since the markets for apartments in Sweden consists of many local markets (Boverket, 2014) 
an area of interest had to be selected. A project that aimed to implement quality rents was 
initiated in Gothenburg 2007. The project is unique since it is primary driven by the Swedish 
Union of Tenants and the private landlords, Swedish Property Federation (Wennermark, 
2008). Gothenburg was therefore considered an interesting area.   
 
In order to be able to compare areas with each other and to be able to find differences between 
the areas, the observations were conducted from areas with different characteristics. 
Biskopsgården and Angered are, according to a report from the Swedish Police (Nationella 
operativa avdelningen, 2015), the area's most exposed to serious crime and socio economic 
factors. Other areas with other locations, such as distance from city centre and distance to 
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water were studied and considered. Since there were few observations areas close to each 
other with similar characteristics were combined. Six areas of interest were used in this study.  
3.2.1 Owner occupied cooperative apartments  
The collection of data from the owner occupied cooperative apartment market was collected 
manually from booli.se. Booli contains information about sold apartments in Sweden. 
Angered and Biskopsgården did not have as many observations as the other areas so all of the 
apartments available were collected. Different numbers of rooms in the apartments were 
considered and the collected data consists of the apartments displayed in the table below.  
Owner occupied cooperative apartments in each area based on number of rooms 
 1 room 2 rooms 3 rooms Total  
Centrum  72 90 82 244 
Majorna  40 40 40 120 
Angered  0 23 16 39 
Biskopsgården  21 40 40 101 
Frölunda 40 40 40 120 
Högsbo 40 40 40 120 
Total   213 273 258 744 
Table 1 Displays the number of apartments in each area based on the number of rooms. 
 
3.2.2 Rental market  
The collection of data from the rental  market was collected manually. The primary contract 
apartments where collected from Boplats.se. Boplats is a market place for primary rental 
contracts in Gothenburg. Information about the secondary contracts was collected from 
hyrabostad.se. It is a market place for primary rental apartments but also contains secondary 
rental apartments in Gothenburg. In this paper, some of the contracts can be considered as the 
black markets which is why the secondary market is called unregulated.  
Number of rental apartments based on contract type and number of rooms 
 Primary Secondary 
1 Room 27 84 
2 Rooms 169 93 
3 Rooms 89 55 
4 Rooms 20 19 
5 Rooms 5 6 
6 Rooms 0 5 
Total rental apartments 309 262 
Table 2 Displays the number of apartments in each area based on the number of rooms. 
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3.3 Multiple Regression Model 
In the paper a multiple regression model is used, and the model is an extended model of the 
single variable regression model and allows us to include additional variables as regressors. 
The model permits us to estimate the effect on 𝑌1 of changing one regressor while holding the 
other constant (Stock & Watson, 2012, s228-229).   
 
𝑌𝑖=𝛽0+𝛽1*𝑋1𝑖+𝛽2*𝑋2𝑖+𝛽3*𝑋3𝑖+𝛽k*𝑋𝑘𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, , 𝑛 
In order to analyze and compare owner occupied cooperative apartments and rental 
apartments, it is necessary to predict a value on how much consumers are willing to pay for an 
apartment of a certain standard. The study looks at a monthly cost and assumes that 
consumers are equivalent when it comes to renting or buying. In order to compare owner 
occupied cooperative apartments and rental apartments, the program Stata was used to predict 
a value on the market value on a rental apartment and the rent paid to the housing cooperative. 
By predicting values on the market price and the monthly rent, a good opportunity to compare 
the two markets is given, based on the assumption that the consumer is indifferent about the 
monthly the cost to be paid as a rent to the landlord or paid to the bank (Stock & Watson, 
2012, s228-229).  
 
3.3.1 Logarithms  
The independent variable has been logarithmed in order to get a percentage interpretation 
change  in the coefficients. A logarithmic regressions tend to have a better chance of being 
linear and, homoskedasticity is more likely to hold and normality is often more plausible 
(Jeffery M. Wooldridge, 2014). 
3.4 Regressions Stata 
3.4.1Step 1  
In all the regressions area, as dummy variables, were used as the independent variables. 
Number of rooms, square meters and squared square meters were used as control variables. 
The control variables reduce the error in the variance and make the results more reliable. 
Variables that increase the r-square, hence reduces the unexplained variance, should be added 
to the regression (Field, 2014,  p479). 
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Variables used in the regressions   
Variables  Type of Variables Used in  Explanation 
Monthly fee Dependent Variable 
Control Variable 
Regression 1 
Regression 2 
The monthly fee for 
owner occupied 
cooperative 
apartments 
Sold Price Dependent Variable Regression 2 The selling price, 
2016 price index 
Primary Rent  Dependent Variable Regression 3 The rent for primary 
contracts  
Secondary Rent  Dependent Variable Regression 4  The rent for 
secondary contracts 
Rooms Control Variable Regression 1,2,3,4 5,6,7 Numbers of rooms 
in the apartment  
Square Meter Control Variable Regression 1,2,3,4 5,6,7 The size of the 
apartment in square 
meters  
Squared Square Meter Control Variable Regression 1,2,3,4 5,6,7 Testing for 
diminishing return 
of square meters 
Majorna Dummy Variable Regression 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 The location of the 
apartment 
Angered Dummy Variable Regression 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 The location of the 
apartment 
Biskopsgården Dummy Variable Regression 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 The location of the 
apartment 
Frölunda Dummy Variable Regression 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 The location of the 
apartment 
Högsbo Dummy Variable Regression 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 The location of the 
apartment 
Table 3 Displays the variables used in the regressions  
Regression 1 
Log Monthlyfee=𝛽0+𝛽1*rooms+𝛽2*square meter+𝛽3*squared square meter+𝛽4*𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑎 +
𝛽5 ∗ 𝐴𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐵𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑜𝑝𝑠𝑔å𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝐹𝑟ö𝑙𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎 + 𝛽8 ∗ 𝐻ö𝑔𝑠𝑏𝑜 + 𝑢𝑖, 𝑖 
 
The first regression was to run a multiple regression with logarithmic monthly fee as the 
dependent variable for all owner occupied cooperative apartment in the sample. The 
coefficients given in the regression was used to predict an expected monthly fee for all the 
apartments in the collected sample. 
Regression 2 
Log Sold Price=𝛽0+𝛽1*rooms+𝛽2*square meter+𝛽3*squared square 
meter+𝛽4*𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦𝑓𝑒𝑒 ++54*𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑎 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐴𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝐵𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑜𝑝𝑠𝑔å𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛 + 𝛽8 ∗
𝐹𝑟ö𝑙𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎 + 𝛽9 ∗ 𝐻ö𝑔𝑠𝑏𝑜 + 𝑢𝑖, 𝑖 
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The next step was to run a multiple regression with logarithmic selling price as the dependent 
variable for all owner occupied cooperative apartment in the sample. The coefficients given in 
the regression was used to predict an expected selling price for all apartments in the sample. 
 
Regression 1+2 
Regression 1 and 2 were then used to calculate a total monthly cost for owner occupied cooperative 
apartment. 
(
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 ∗ 0.02
12
) + 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑓𝑒𝑒 
 
When estimating the monthly cost for the owner occupied cooperative apartments the interest 
rate of two percent was used. This was based on information from the four largest banks in 
Sweden which are SEB, Swedbank, Handelsbanken and Nordea.  
Regression 3 
Log Primary Rent=𝛽0+𝛽1*rooms+𝛽2*square meter+𝛽3*squared square 
meter+𝛽4*𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑎 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐴𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐵𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑜𝑝𝑠𝑔å𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝐹𝑟ö𝑙𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎 + 𝛽8 ∗
𝐻ö𝑔𝑠𝑏𝑜 + 𝑢𝑖, 𝑖 
 
Step three was to run a regression with logarithmic primary rent as the dependent variable for 
all primary-contracts in the collected data. The coefficients given in the regression was then 
used to predict an expected primary rent for all apartments in the sample. 
Regression 4 
Log Secondary Rent=𝛽0+𝛽1*rooms+𝛽2*square meter+𝛽3*squared square 
meter+𝛽4*𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑎 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐴𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐵𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑜𝑝𝑠𝑔å𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝐹𝑟ö𝑙𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎 + 𝛽8 ∗
𝐻ö𝑔𝑠𝑏𝑜 + 𝑢𝑖, 𝑖 
 
Step four was to run a multiple regression with logarithmic secondary rent as the dependent 
variable for all secondary contracts in the collected data. The coefficients given in the 
regression was then used to predict an expected secondary rent for all apartments in the 
sample. 
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3.4.2 Step 2 
In order to interpret how different areas affect the difference in price between the various 
contracts, a comparison between predicted selling price, predicted primary rent and predicted 
secondaryrent was made. This was done by calculating the difference between the different 
contracts. Thisgaveus new variables, called: 
New DependentVariables  
Variables  Typ of 
Variables 
Used in  Explanation 
Diff Primary and 
Secondary 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
Regression 
5 
 
The difference in price between 
predicted secondary rent and 
predicted primary rent 
Diff Primary and 
Monthly cost 
Dependent 
Variable 
Regression 
6 
The difference in price between 
predicted primary rent and 
predicted monthly cost for owner 
occupied cooperative apartments  
Secondary and 
Monthly cost 
Dependent 
Variable 
Regression 
7 
The difference in price between 
predicted secondary rent and 
predicted monthly cost for owner 
occupied cooperative apartments 
Table 4The table shows three new dependent variables 
These variables were then used as independent variables in regressions: 
Regression 5 
DiffPrimary and Secondary=𝛽0+𝛽1*rooms+𝛽2*square meter+𝛽3*squared square 
meter+𝛽4*𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑎 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐴𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐵𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑜𝑝𝑠𝑔å𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝐹𝑟ö𝑙𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎 + 𝛽8 ∗
𝐻ö𝑔𝑠𝑏𝑜 + 𝑢𝑖, 𝑖 
 
Regression 6 
DiffPrimary and MonthlyCost=𝛽0+𝛽1*rooms+𝛽2*square meter+𝛽3*squared square 
meter+𝛽4*𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑎 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐴𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐵𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑜𝑝𝑠𝑔å𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝐹𝑟ö𝑙𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎 + 𝛽8 ∗
𝐻ö𝑔𝑠𝑏𝑜 + 𝑢𝑖, 𝑖 
 
Regression 7 
DiffSecondary and MonthlyCost=𝛽0+𝛽1*rooms+𝛽2*square meter+𝛽3*squared square 
meter+𝛽4*𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟𝑛𝑎 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐴𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐵𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑜𝑝𝑠𝑔å𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝐹𝑟ö𝑙𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎 + 𝛽8 ∗
𝐻ö𝑔𝑠𝑏𝑜 + 𝑢𝑖, 𝑖 
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3.4.3Step 3 
At last we deduced a t-tests between the means within each group. First step was to run a t-
test among the predicted monthly cost and primary, then run a t-test for the predicted monthly 
cost and secondary and last run a t-test for secondary and primary. This was done to interpret 
if the means in the different groups was statistically different from each other. 
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4. Empirical results 
 
This chapter explains the results from the regressions. Every output is illustrated in a table 
and explained. The chapter ends with a t-test. 
 
4.1 Interpretation of the apartment market 
Regressions   
 Monthly cost 
owner occupied 
cooperative 
apartments 2016  
Rents for 
primary 
contracts     
 
Rents for secondary 
contracts 
 
Rooms 0.1081*** 
 
-0.0479* 
 
0.0648 
 
 (0.0209) (0.0271) (0.0537) 
Square meters 0.0384*** 
 
0.0284*** 0.0134*** 
 
 (0.0056) (0.0032) (0.0024) 
Squered Square 
meters 
-0.0001*** 
 
-0.0000*** 
 
-0.0000*** 
 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
MonthlyFee -0.0003*** 
 
--- --- 
 (0.0000) --- ---- 
Majorna -0.0700*** 
 
-0.0928** 
 
-0.1625** 
 
 (0.0347) (0.0373) (0.0701) 
Angered -0.9890*** 
 
-0.1787*** 
 
-0.2011** 
 
 (0.1254) (0.0293) (0.0717) 
Biskopsgården -1.0851*** 
 
-0.1777*** 
 
-0.0770 
 
 (0.0219) (0.0293) (0.0704) 
Frölunda 0.1742*** 
 
-0.0008 
 
-0.2092* 
 
 (0.0256) (0.0431) (0.1187) 
Högsbo -0.3518*** 
 
0.0139 
 
-0.0982 
 
  (0.0661) (0.1123) 
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Constant 14.0835*** 7.4839*** 
 
8.2085*** 
 
 (0.0720) (0.0991) (0.0568) 
R-squared 0.8953 0.6747 0.5611 
 
Table 5 Displays regressions for the contracts 2016  
4.1.1 Price for owner occupied cooperative apartments 2016   
The R2 value of the regression is 0,8953, indicating that the variables describes 89.53 percent 
of the variation in selling price. The output shows a predicted sold price based on the market 
price from 2016 for all of the apartments in the dataset. The coefficients square meters shows 
that squared meters have a positive return on the sold price, this effect is positive and 
statistically significant. The coefficient Squared square meters is negative and statistically 
significant, this indicates that the effect of square meters follows the law of diminishing return 
and that an increase in square meters will have a bigger impact on the selling price on small 
apartments.  
The coefficient monthly fee indicates that the selling price is negatively affected by 0,005 
percent for every extra SEK in the monthly rent. This effect is statistically significant but very 
small, so the coefficient indicates that monthly rent do not have a big impact on the selling 
price.  
The output shows that all areas have a statistically significant impact on the selling price.  The 
coefficient Centrum has been left out and used as the reference area. The output shows that all 
areas have lower selling price compared to the Centrum and this effect is statistically 
significant.  
4.1.2 Rents for secondary contracts  
The R2 value of the regression is 0,5611, indicating that the variables describe 56.11 percent 
of variation in the selling price. The coefficients square meters show that square meters have a 
positive return on the sold price, this effect is positive and statistically significant. The 
coefficient Squared square meters is negative and statistically significant, this indicates that 
the effect of square meters follows the law of diminishing return and that an increase in 
square meters will have a bigger impact on the selling price on small apartments.  
The coefficients indicate that Angered and Majorna are statistically highly significant and 
affect the selling price negative by 16.25 and 20.10 percent compared to the reference area 
Centrum. The coefficient Frölunda are statistically significant at a ten percent 
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significancelevel.  
 
4.1.3 Rents for primary contracts  
The R2 value of the regression is 0,6747, indicating that the variables describes 67,47 percent 
of variation in the selling price. The coefficients square meters shows that square meters have 
a positive return on the sold price, this effect is positive and statistically significant. The 
coefficient Squared square meters is negative and statistically significant, this indicates that 
the effect of square meters follows the law of diminishing return and that an increase in 
square meters will have a bigger impact on the selling price on small apartments. 
The coefficients indicate that Majorna, Angered and Biskopsgårdenare statistically significant 
and affect the selling price negative by 9.28, 17.87 and 17.77 percent compared to the 
reference, Centrum.  
 
4.2 Differences between contract types 
Differencesbetweencontracttypes 
R-squared = 0.9356 
 Diffprimary and 
secondary 
 
Diff Monthly Cost 
and Secondary 
Diff Monthly Cost 
and primary 
Rooms 805*** 41.4896 
 
846*** 
 
 (51.49) (100.96) (131.43) 
Square meters -66*** 31.0554* -36* 
 (5.25) (16.36) (20.76) 
Squered Square 
meters 
0.44*** -0.1645 
 
0.28 
 (0.04) (0.14) (0.17) 
Majorna -632*** 534*** -99 
 (24.21) (75.67) (86.16) 
Angered -591*** -2150*** -2741*** 
 (26.94) (84.09) (98.9) 
Biskopsgården 445*** -3494*** 
 
-3049*** 
 
 (29.81) (109.86) (125.09) 
Frölunda -1432*** 
 
-454*** 
 
-1886*** 
 
 (33.26) (67.90) (88.03) 
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Högsbo -756*** -1046*** -1802*** 
 (23.89) (55.87) (74.02) 
Constant 2850*** -762* 2088*** 
 (123) (413) (524) 
R-squared 0.9356 0,6837 0,6671 
Table 6Differences between contract types 
 
4.2.1 Difference between primary and secondary  
The R2 value of the regression is 0,9356, indicating that the variables describe 93.56 percent 
of variation in differences between the contracts.  The output shows that rooms, square meters 
and squared square meters are statistically significant. All of the coefficients in the output are 
statistically significant, indicating that the difference between predicted secondary rent and 
primary rent are affected differently depending on the area.   
The constant indicates that the secondary rent in average is 2850 SEK higher than the primary 
rent. The coefficient Majorna indicates that the difference in secondary rent and primary rent 
in average is 632 SEK less than in Centrum. The difference in Angered is on average 590 
SEK less than in Centrum, the difference in Biskopsgården is on average 445 SEK higher 
than in Centrum and the coefficient Högsbo indicate that the difference in average is 756 SEK 
less than in Centrum. The coefficient Frölunda, indicates that the difference is 1432 SEK less 
than Centrum, thus a average difference of 1418 SEK between secondary rent and primary 
rent in Frölunda.  
4.2.2 Difference between secondary and monthly cost for owner occupied 
cooperative apartment  
The R2 value of the regression is 0,6837, indicating that the variables describes 68.37 percent 
of variation in the selling price. The output shows that rooms and squared square meters are 
not statistically significant and square meters are weakly significant. All of the areas in the 
output are statistically significant, indicating that the difference between predicted secondary 
rent and predicted monthly rent on owner occupied cooperative apartment. rent are affected 
differently depending on the area.   
The constant indicates that the secondary rent on average is 762 SEK higher than the monthly 
rent on owner occupied cooperative apartment. The coefficient Majorna indicates that the 
secondary rent and monthly rent on owner occupied cooperative apartment in average is 533 
SEK less than in Centrum, thus the difference in rent and monthly fee is 228 SEK. The 
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difference in Angered is on average 2150 SEK bigger than in Centrum, the difference in 
Frölunda is on average 454 SEK bigger than in Area1 and the coefficient Högsbo indicate that 
the difference in average is 1046 SEK bigger than in Centrum. The coefficient Biskopsgården, 
indicates that the difference is 3494 SEK bigger than in Centrum, thus a average difference of 
4256 SEK between secondary rent and monthly fee in Biskopsgården.  
4.2.3 Difference between primary and monthly cost for owner occupied 
cooperative apartment 
 
The R2 value of the regression is 0,6671, indicating that the variables describe 66.71 percent 
of variation in the selling price. The output shows that squared square meter is insignificant, 
square meter is significant at a 10 percent level and rooms are highly significant All of the 
areas, except Majorna, are statistically significant, indicating that the difference between 
predicted monthly rent on owner occupied cooperative apartment rent and primary rent are 
affected differently depending on the area. The insignificance in Majorna is assumed to be 
explained by lack of observations. 
The constant indicates that the monthly fee on average is 2088 SEK higher than the primary 
rent. The coefficient Angered indicates that the difference in monthly fee and primary rent in 
average is 2730 SEK less in Angered than in Centrum, hence the primary rent is in average 
652 SEK higher than the predicted monthly cost of owner occupied cooperative apartment. 
The coefficient Biskopsgården indicates that the difference in monthly fee and primary rent in 
average is 3049 SEK less in Biskopsgården than in Centrum, hence the primary rent is in 
average 961 SEK higher than the predicted monthly cost of owner occupied cooperative 
apartment in this area. In Frölunda the predicted monthly cost is in average 202 SEK higher 
than the predicted monthly cost of owner occupied cooperative apartment. In Högsbo the 
predicted monthly cost is in average 286 SEK higher than the predicted monthly cost of 
owner occupied cooperative apartment. 
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4.3Diffrence in meanbetween the contracttypes 
 
T-test  
 Mean Std. Dev Ha: diff<0 Ha: diff≠0 Ha: diff>0 
 
Primary Rent 5580 1821 
 
   
Secondary Rent 7740 2412 
 
   
   
 
0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Primary Rent 5580 1821 
 
   
MonthlyCost 7347 38087 
 
   
   
 
0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Secondary Rent 7740 2412 
 
   
MonthlyCost 7347 38087 
 
   
   0.0001 0.0003 0.9999 
      
Table 7Displays the output from a T-test on the contract types  
4.3.1 T-test 
The output shows that the difference in means between primary rent and secondary rent is 
2160, the difference in means between primary rent and the cost for owner occupied 
cooperative apartments is 1767 and the difference in means between secondary rent and the 
cost for owner occupied cooperative apartments is 393. The output indicates that there is a 
statistically significant difference in mean among the three samples. The output indicates that 
the secondary rent higher than monthly cost for owner occupied cooperative apartments and 
that the monthly cost for owner occupied cooperative apartments is higher than the primary 
rent. 
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5. Analysis 
 
This chapter starts with hypothesis A and continues with hypothesis B and hypothesis C. It is 
followed by effects on the market and ends with the situation today.  
 
5.1 Hypothesis A 
The empirical part in this paper strengthens the hypothesis A: Area affects the rent and 
monthly cost for all contracts when it comes to the primary market and the owner occupied 
cooperative market. Table 5column rents for primary contracts shows that the quality rents in 
Gothenburg today take areas into account which is what could be expected according to 
Wennermark (2008). The results indicate that the rent in the less attractive areas 
Biskopsgården and Angered are 18 percent lower than in the inner city, which is considered 
the more attractive area. 
Another reason for rents to differ might be due to the fact that landlords are allowed to raise 
the rent if the technical qualities of the property, the service quality or the relationship quality 
is improved (Wennermark, 2008). This indicates that more attractive areas where demand is 
high, it is profitable for landlords to increase the standard of the apartments in order to be able 
to charge a higher rent from tenants. While it is not profitable for landlords in less attractive 
areas to increase the standard of the apartments because the demand is low and there is the 
risk of not getting the required rent. 
Table 5 column rents for secondary contracts shows that the coefficient area is insignificant 
and do not have an impact on the rent for some of the areas in the collected data. This result 
indicates that we have to reject the null in hypothesis A when it comes to the secondary 
market. This result can be interpreted as the housing crisis today makes people so desperate 
for homes that area will not affect the price you are willing to pay; hence people are so 
desperate for apartments that they do not care where its is located.  
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5.2 Hypothesis B 
The empirical part of this study strengthens the null hypothesis B: The regulated primary rent 
is lower than the price on the free market, hence the secondary rent and the monthly cost for 
owner occupied cooperative apartments. The result in the empirical part, table 7, indicates 
that the primary market on average is 1767 SEK lower than the price for the owner occupied 
cooperative market and on average 2160 SEK lower than the secondary market. This result 
indicates that the primary rent is on average 1767-2160 SEK below the equilibrium price 
today.  
Thies (2009) theory about the equilibrium rent describes that the regulated can create spillover 
effects on the unregulated sector if the regulated rent is below the equilibrium rent. The 
empirical part of this study indicates that the regulated market of primary contracts in 
Gothenburg creates spillover effects on the market. The results show that the rents on the 
unregulated secondary market is significantly higher than rents in the primary market. Hence, 
the regulation inhibits the market from equilibrium, the real price that consumers are willing 
to pay for an apartment is reflected in the housing market and the secondary market. The 
market, which always seeks equilibrium, then will circumvent the problem by "alternative 
mechanisms”, like black trade, etc. The secondary market in our data is assumed not to be 
regulated, as the primary market, which may indicate that there is a propagation black market 
where people are taking advantage of the housing crisis. In a report from the National Board 
of Housing, Building and Planning (Boverket, 2014), the evidence of a propagating black 
market is presented, the result in this paper indicate that this is due to low primary rent.  
5.3 Hypothesis C 
Hypothesis C: The secondary rent is equalto the monthlycost for owner occupiedcooperative 
apartments. The empirical part in this study indicates that null hypothesis C must be rejected. 
There is a statisticallysignificantdifference in the secondary market and the owner 
occupiedcooperative market. The secondary rent is statisticallysignificantlyhigherthan the 
monthlycostofowner occupiedcooperative apartments. 
The problem withthisresult is that people will always be in need of housing, which means that 
if there are no apartments available on the primary market, consumers will turn to either the 
housing market or the secondary market. It can be assumed that consumers that have the 
ability to buy an apartment will turn to the housing market, while consumers who cannot get 
loans or cannot pay a down payment of at least 15 percent of the purchase price will turn to 
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the secondary market. This creates problems because housing plays a big role in people's 
lives, meaning that these consumers are forced to accept a high rent on the secondary market 
in order to have somewhere to stay. Consumers on the secondary market will then have less 
money to spend on consumption and saving, which will affect the economy in general.  
5.4 Negative side effects 
The paper indicates that the price of a secondary contract is statistically significant higher 
compared to a primary contract. This price difference between the contracts creates 
opportunity for an increased black market, hence people see an opportunity to keep primary 
contracts and make money by renting them out on the secondary market. A side effect that 
causes fewer primary contracts on the market and a growing black market. A effect that is 
predicted to occur in Thies (2009) theory; that the market is always searching towards 
equilibrium, which in this case will be through alternative methods, hence the black market. 
Raised in the earlier parts of the paper, there is a trend to convert rental apartments into owner 
occupied cooperative apartments. This conversion can be assumed to be due to the fact that 
landlords do not see any profit in the rental market as this market is regulated. 
When the rental apartments are converted to owner occupied cooperative apartments there 
will be fewer primary contracts available on the market. Consumers are then forced to 
alternative markets, in this case the housing market or the secondary market. A disadvantage 
that segregates the market, as consumers with less ability to pay are forced to accept 
unfavorable contract.   
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6. Conclusion 
 
The results in this paper indicate that the regulation of the rental market in Gothenburg do 
not fulfill its purpose. This study also shows, among other things, that there is a significant 
difference in monthly cost for different contract types. 
 
 
The purpose of a regulated rental market: everyone should have the right to a safe living 
situation, regardless income. Decision-makers starting point is good in theory but in practice 
the regulation have many side effects (Eklund, 2013, 47-49) 
 
The results from this study shows a significant difference in monthly cost for apartments 
depending on area and contract type in Gothenburg. The regulation creates negative side 
effects on the society. With the current housing shortage in addition, segregation and black 
trade results in fewer apartments on the primary market. Based on this study the purpose of 
the regulation fails.  
By liberalize the market and allow the rents to be controlled by the free market, the incentives 
to rent out apartments on the black market might decrease. People will see no profit in 
retaining their primary contracts when there is no difference in price. A liberalizing of the 
market would allow landlords to charge a higher rent, hence the incentive to convert rental 
apartments into owner occupied cooperative apartments decreases. 
An alternative to guarantee the people a safe living situation would be to introduce economic 
support for people in need. This solution would guarantee people's security and still keep the 
market in equilibrium. 
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(Wennermark, 2008) 
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Appendix 2 
Monthly rent for owner occupied cooperative apartments 
R-squered = 0.7322 
Variables  
 
Rooms -0.0211 
 
 (0.0214) 
Square meters 0.0417*** 
 
 (0.0033) 
Squered Square meters -0.0002*** 
 
 (0.0000) 
Majorna 0.1256*** 
 
 (0.0233) 
Angered 0.2652*** 
 
  
Biskopsgården -0.0317 
 
 (0.0197) 
Frölunda 0.1742*** 
 
 0.0256 
Högsbo 0.0746*** 
 
 0.0203 
Constant 6.3874*** 
 
 0.0773 
 
